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GERHARD THÜR (VIENNA) 
LEGAL PROCEDURE IN THE GORTYN CODE 
RESPONSE TO MICHAEL GAGARIN 
At present Michael Gagarin is the greatest authority on Cretan legal sources. Since 
his books on Drakon (1981) and Early Creek Law (1986) we have discussed 
together the meaning of dikazein in archaic Greek sources from Homer to Draco and 
Gortyn. The following few re marks will carry on our arguments. Dikazein is the key 
word in understanding ancient Greek legal procedure. Our late friend Mario 
Talamanca (1979) took part in the discussion as Eva Cantarella and Alberto Maffi 
still do . While friendship has always survived we all had and still have completely 
different points of view. Disregarding my view on Homer I will concentrate on 
Gortyn. Nevertheless , also on this topic I hold the idea of a unity of Greek law, a 
unity not of uniform legal institutions , but rather of different developments derived 
from consistent basic ideas , to speak with Hans Julius Wolff, the founder of our 
Symposion: "verschiedene Ausformungen einheitlicher Grundgedanken." 
Our modern understanding of judge and judgment doesn 't go back further than 
to Late Antiquity. Today judges are civil servants, who decide the facts at their own 
discretion , legally bound by law codes or precedents and embedded in a hierarchy of 
public jurisdiction. This legal culture comes from the Roman cognitio extra ordinem 
and is called "Beamtenjustiz." The ordo iudiciorum of the Roman republic and 
principate was different. In a first stage one of the supreme magistrates, the praetor, 
appointed the trial by admitting alegis actio or a jormula, and then a board of 
laymen , centumviri or recuperatores, or a single layman, the iudex privatus. Only in 
the second stage the laymen gave decisions, strictly bound by the wordings proposed 
by the plaintiff and decreed by the magistrate. This system was also used in ancient 
Athens, except for the iudex privatus. Nowhere in Greece do we find an authority 
like a civil servant especially engaged in jurisdiction . 
My first objection to Gagarin is that until now he never did answer my question, 
who the Gortynian dikastas was. Wolff thought of a iudex privatus, but was 
universally and rightly rejected. Gagarin seems to follow the general opinion the 
dikastas was a special authority like a modern judge [now closer explained in the 
written version of his paper]. But there are no paralleIs in any Greek source. Beyond 
Gortyn we have some inscriptions which tell us the kosmoi, the Cretan magistrates , 
also acted as dikastai (see Nomima 1.74 , 81, 2.80). The magistrates' dikazein and 
gignöskein , everywhere else equal to krinein , is exactly wh at the Gortynian dikastas 
did. My conclusion is when the Law Code is speaking of a dikastas it means the 
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single kosmos responsible for the kind of cases in issue, the ksenios kosmos for 
example (XI 14-17) and the dikastas for hetairiai (see Gagarin , above p. 138f.). In 
the highly technical language of the Code dikastas seems to mean the "competent 
magistrate;" likewise in archaic Athens the competent archon is called dikastes 
(Dem. 23.28 , 41 .71), which term later is reserved for the men sitting in the jury. 
Anyway , for Athens and Gortyn the translation "judge" in our technical sense is 
misleading . With the Code I prefer to stick to dikastas having in my mind the 
kosmos responsible for the case . 
After these, I think, necessary preliminaries I come to Gagarin 's main subject: 
the fundamental distinction between dikadden and krinen, rule and decide 
respectively. First, what was the normal method and what the exception, and second, 
could either procedure change into the other, as Maffi has argued. 
First, before looking at default and exception we must clarify both methods . 
Omnynta krinen porti ta moliomena in XI 26-31 seems to be very simple: the 
dikastas, the magistrate, is allowed to decide the case at his own discretion . 
Normally the verb omnynta is overIooked. Aristotle mentions in his Politics (l28b 
9-12) that, formerly, some kings (comparable to magistrates) gave judgments under 
oath. In historical times only private arbitrators seem to have given their awards 
under oath (Dem. 52.30f.). In a society where oath swearing was taken seriously, as 
the Law Code presupposes, with his own free decision the dikastas took a great 
personal risk. To the parties, who had no appeal to a higher court, it was a sacral 
guarantee for correct decision. This method demonstrates on the one hand the 
progressive and on the other the archaic character of Gortynian litigation. 
The oath of the Gortynian dikastas was not Iike the heliastic oath sworn by the 
Athenian jurymen at the beginning of each year. Later , they sat in the large law 
courts and cast their votes anonymously. In Gortyn it was a more serious matter: the 
oath was sworn by a magistrate every time when he passed a free decision in a 
lawsuit. So he took personal responsibility and, besides sacral punishment, with 
every biased judgment risked his social reputation . 
Problematic is the meaning of porti ta moliomena in XI 30-31 . I prefer Willet's 
translation "according to the pleas" to Gagarin's "with reference to the pleadings ." 
Normally in Greek trials the court decision is on the claim and counterclaim. Here I 
follow Maffi. Even when the dikastas was allowed to decide at his own discretion he 
was restricted to the pleas, to a simple "yes" or "no". In a general rule on trial 
decision this is in no way superfluous to mention. The phrase has nothing to do with 
evidence, as Gagarin holds (above, p. 137): " . .. this would mean that he should 
consider the evidence on both sides, including witnesses, and any arguments that 
either side might present." Since both the pleas and the pleadings were oral it is 
difficult to distinguish the meanings of molen . However , explaining the phrase as a 
provision on free assessment of proofs seems to me thinking in a too modern way. 
Still dealing with my first point to clarify both methods of rendering adecision I 
come to the most controversial topic, the meaning of dikadden. It obviously does not 
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mean dikazein in the sense of what the Athenian jurymen did , rendering decisions by 
secretly voting . We all agree that in 5th century Gortyn no law courts existed. 
However, one can compare the dikadden of the Gortynian kosmos with the dikazein 
of the Athenian basileis in Draco's law on homicide . In my-not uncontested-
opinion the basileis formulated the diämosiai, the oaths to be sworn initially by 
either litigant before the 51 ephetai voted on the case (diagnänai). Also a board of 
ephetai did not exist in Gortyn. But I think we can, how controversial the issue 
might be, compare the Gortynian dikadden with the dikazein decree of the Athenian 
basileis . Cautiously Gagarin now translates dikadden simply with "rule" and I agree 
with hirn . Inconsistently and without sufficient explanation in his new book Writing 
(2008, 96) he still translates the dikazein of the Athenian basileis with "judge" in 
contrast to "decide" for diagnonai . I think "rule" is correct for dikazein in either 
case. 
A Greek magistrate usually did not render verdicts, he was competent in ruling . 
Also in the Gortynian Code there are several examples of ruling, dikadden , beyond 
trial decisions: in V 31 the dikastas is not yet deciding an action for partition ; he just 
provisionally assigns the estate to one of the c1aimants until the property will be 
divided. Also the heiress (VIII 40-7) is assigned to the relative who refuses to marry 
her not by verdict , but by a simple order. These cases are parallel to the epidikasia 
decrees of the Athenian archon in inheritance and family issues . Also the dikaksato 
lagasai in I 6 is a simple order, and everywhere in Greece the word for a 
magistrate's imposing a fine is katadikazein . All these passages are additional 
arguments that the Gortynian dikastas belongs among the magistrates . He is the 
kosmos competent for the matter in issue. 
But what did the dikadden of the kosmosldikastas in a lawsuit look like? The 
general provision , XI 26-31, directs him-I quote Gagarin's translation (above, p. 
128): "to rule (dikadden) according to witnesses or an oath of denial." The meaning 
of kata (according) is problematic. Did the dikastas rule or decide before or after the 
swearing ceremony? Gagarin correctly holds the oath follows the ruling and whether 
sworn or not, the defendant automatically won or lost his case. By dikadden the 
dikastas imposed the oath upon a litigant. The case of the divorced wo man charged 
with having taken away her ex-husband's property (11 36-45) shows that the 
swearing ceremony took place after the ruling. After swearing, no further dikadden 
was necessary. And if the woman refused to swear within a certain time (XI 46-55) 
she lost the case and, pace Maffi, no krinen decision followed. Fortunately the 
provisions on the divorced women are detailed enough. Other provisions on decisive 
oaths can be explained only by conjecture, as Gagarin correctly did. 
But I completely disagree with Gagarin on the meaning of the first phrase in XI 
26-28, kata maityrans ... dikadden. Here we have the same methodological problem. 
In the code there are a many short references in technical language , but only one 
provision goes into details, IX 24-40. I concentrate on lines 34-40: first, the 
witnesses had to "speak" (apoponnionton) , and after they had "spoken" (profeiponti) 
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the dikastas had to rule that the plaintiff and the witnesses swear. The crucial word 
is apoponen, in the Code it is only used for witnesses. Gagarin translates it with 
"testify ." He holds (above, p. 134): "This unique double requirement-the witnesses 
testify and swear-may have been incIuded because in this case one of the original 
parties has died and so the legislator wished to impose an extra degree of certainty 
on the ruling ." 
I think the requirement is neither double nor unique. Fortunately , again we have 
so me details not mentioned in other provisions, which allow us to conjecture. In my 
opinion apoponen doesn't mean to testify. Rather the witness decIared before the 
dikastas that he is ready to testify . Then the dikastas had to rule that the witness 
should swear the decisive oath . This is the procedure behind the concise technical 
phrase dikadden kata maityrans. IX 24-40 provides neither a double requirement nor 
an extra degree of certainty. It sheds light on the normal procedure of witness 
testimony of Gortyn. In X 34-40 not the method of evidence is unique, but rather the 
liability of the heirs of a deceased debtor reduced to the simple amount (line 40). 
With these conjectures the general provision in XI 26-31 shows a completely 
consistent structure: when the Code provides decisions by ruling, the magistrates 
were bound to impose decisive oaths upon witnesses and/or litigants, in all other 
cases the magistrates were allowed or sometimes-when explicitly provided-
obliged, to take the oaths themselves. In any case oaths were necessary, but an oath 
sworn by different persons: by the witness (to be conjectured), by a litigant 
(apomoton), or by the magistrate (omnynta). The sources from the 6'h century are too 
fragmentary to allow even conjectures on how dikazein exactly looked like. 
Gagarin ' s question whether automatic procedures or free decision making was the 
normal method of judicial decision in the Gortyn Law Code seems to be a more or 
less apparent one. 
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